by Daniel Evans U6P
The question of following one’s moral intuition is entirely different to that of trusting it. Certainly, there are reasons for one to follow their moral intuition - indeed, the laws and sanctions of our society are aimed (and succeed to a great extent) to prevent actions deemed immoral. However, regardless of the benefits or disadvantages of having a moral intuition, the question of trusting it can only be answered through a lens independent of one’s own egocentric moral perceptions; and ultimately, the question can only be answered with a resounding no.
First considered must be the concept of trust itself: trust may be defined as “firm belief in the reliability, truth or ability of someone or something.” In this essay, these criteria will be applied to moral intuition in order to determine how much we really know right from wrong.
Reliability
Epistemology is one of the most distinctive and contentious features of ethical intuitionism. Many classical intuitionists, such as Ralph Cudworth and Francis Hutcheson, suggest that the basic principles of morality are self-evident - that is, that moral propositions can be universally known without the need for external evidence. One contention to this argument however, is that individual morality may actually be shaped more by personal bias than previously suggested. One example of this is a study carried out which indicated that people believed it was ‘fair’ if they were overpaid and someone else was underpaid for doing the same work (Messick & Sentis 1979). A 1988 study conducted by Greenberg (1983) suggested that an individual perceives overpayment to a similar other as unfair, further contributing to the argument that egocentric moral perceptions are fundamentally flawed (Bocian 2020). This could be due to the nature of morality - we tend to evaluate the personal consequences of actions and consider positive consequences for the individual to be more morally right than negative ones, or even than positive consequences for a similar other that is not oneself.
Furthermore, studies such as the Milgram Experiment (1963) suggest that morality changes due to circumstances. The participant’s administering of what they thought was a 450 volt shock is something most would not do normally due to a belief that causing pain in another is ‘morally wrong’; however, the fact that there was a man in a lab coat to whom they could abdicate responsibility for their actions led to 65% of the participants pressing the button. Exacerbating this point of view is a study carried out (Yudkin et al, 2019) which indicated that an individual’s moral intuition changes depending on who the individual is with. This is extremely indicative of the fickle nature - and therefore unreliability - of one’s moral intuition.
Truth
Moral intuition, then, is not reliable. The question must next be put to its truth. Is morality some sort of God-given gift, or can it be argued that its origins are far more worldly? To consider the inherent truth of the nature of one’s moral intuition, take a more polemic example. The concept that murder is wrong can be convincingly argued to be epistemic; the taking of life has been seen as something inherently wrong for all of recorded history. Religious texts such as the Bible, Quran and Torah all often condemn murder; whilst it is a fact that many throughout time have perpetrated violence in the name of religion (The Crusades, ISIS etc), it can be stated that this violence is overall used by a minority in all faiths. Therefore, if every faith, and almost all atheists/agnostics can agree on it, and have always done, can the immorality of murder be argued to be an innate knowledge of all humans? Absolutely not. One other thing that has not changed since the dawn of time is humanity’s fear of death - this is unarguably the case. Therefore, it is natural that significant social ramifications must follow murder; across all time periods, the perfectly natural and evolutionarily advantageous ‘What if I’m next’ mindset has prevailed. As such, the instilling of a belief that it is ‘good’ not to murder people is perhaps not a product of any innate moral compass but rather an informed decision in light of the harsh punishments for murder in society.
Be it that traditional morality is merely an evolutionary advantage which manifests itself as an apparently innate moral knowledge, or that it is a belief drilled into us from a very young age by ideological state apparatus such as religious institutions, the media and the family (Althusser 19XX), moral intuition is a product of society, not oneself. Theological pressures include stories such as Cain and Abel in Christianity or Qabil and Halil in Islam, which contribute to religious propaganda regarding murder and serve to instil in the believer the desired moral values of the religion itself. The prime example of environmental stimuli impacting moral intuition is the discrepancy in attitudes to the death penalty across the world. 64% of Americans believe that “the death penalty is morally justified” (Pew Research Center, 2021). In contrast, in the UK (where capital punishment is not practised), just 40% support it (YouGov 2022). It is possible to argue along the lines of Gramsci’s hegemony principle, therefore, that the ideology pushed by those in power actually influences the moral compass of the people in that country. This interpretation is further supported by the tabula rasa theory of John Locke himself; if a child is a blank slate whose entire character - necessarily including morality - will be impressed upon them by their environment, it is natural for them to believe exactly what they are told by the ideological state apparatuses near to them. Therefore, morality is not innate - it is simply a societal construct which acts to keep order. As such, if truth can be defined as something untainted and constant, moral intuition is absolutely not ‘true’.
Whilst it is very easy to say that arguing against murder being naturally wrong is simply ridiculous, sidestepping the issue would be giving in to one’s own egocentric cognitive biases. To question the basis of humanity’s aversion to murder is not akin to condoning murder itself - traditional morality still applies even if it has its roots in societal pressures.
Ability
A ‘firm belief’ in neither the reliability nor the truth of one’s moral intuition can be held, this essay posits. But can at least the ability of one’s moral compass be commended? Certainly crime rates are relatively low - some may argue that regardless of the origins of morality, the effects of it are to reduce social negatives and increase positives - such as keeping the homicide rate close to zero, or giving money to someone in need, for example a homeless person. However, this second example can be considered more closely to analyse what’s truly happening in an interaction which at first seems to be simply a ‘good deed’.
The interaction between the giver and the beneficiary is characterised by the exchange of a physical medium, most often money but sometimes food. What, then, does the giver receive in return? Dopamine. A study showed that people feel happy when they spend their money on somebody else (Buchanan & Bardi, 2011). The act of giving is essentially an economic tradeoff - the cost of giving is weighed up against the expected happiness - dopamine - gained from the interaction.Whilst this may at first seem positive both personally and socially, allowing us to have faith in the ability of our moral intuition, it also indicates that one’s moral intuition may not actually be so ‘moral’. Despite giving money perhaps being the best outcome to society as a whole - the beneficiary gains food or money and the giver gains dopamine - the benefactor will only give if the tradeoff is beneficial to him. This condemns the ability of one’s moral intuition to do the ‘right thing’, even if they do end up giving. If one’s moral intuition is merely a computer analysing how much utility the individual will gain from any interaction, the question must be raised: at what point do we cease to be moral and start to be selfish? For every person that gives to a homeless person, ten more look the other way. Does the generosity of an individual depend on how much money is in their pocket?
The fact that the opportunity cost of a traditionally moral action has a bearing on whether or not that action is carried out has significant implications for one’s belief in the ability of their morality. An individual cannot have faith in the ability of an autonomous moral intuition that would change its decisions based on the price of a Tesco meal deal. The most convincing argument in opposition to this idea is that the would-be beneficiary knows that their action is wrong; however, if the person in question knows what they do is the morally wrong thing to do and does it anyway, the effectiveness and power of the moral compass can be called into question - can a tool that is never used even be called a tool? Therefore, whilst many positive societal impacts can come from moral actions, the inconsistency of morality across different individuals - or even the same individual at different times - make it very difficult to have a ‘firm belief’ in the ability of one’s moral compass to differentiate between right and wrong in a way that will force action to be taken.
In conclusion, moral intuition is unreliable because it will say different things in different cases, and tends towards egocentrism; it is inconsistent. Moral intuition is untruthful in the sense that it is not a natural and consistent feature that is innate - its roots are both evolutionary and environmental. Moral intuition is not able as it functions not in terms of what will cause the best social outcome but in terms of what will give the individual the most utility. Therefore, there is no good reason to trust our moral intuition.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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