IONUT CHIRU (L6)
This article placed 1st in the Sixth Form category of the History Witold Pilecki Essay Competition 2022.
The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 was a revolt in Budapest as a result of political instability brought about by the death of Stalin in 1953 coupled with the lack of essential supplies, culminating in the overthrow of the Communist government and the appointment of Imre Nagy as the ruler of the country. On the 1st of November, Nagy announced to the protestors a wave of reforms, including his decision to take Hugnary out of the Warsaw Pact- promoting a massive Soviet invasion of Hungary with around 60,000 troops between the 3rd and 4th of November. This brutal invasion led to the deaths of between 2,000-20,0000 Hungarian civilians and the execution of Nagy two years later as the newly reinstated Communist government under Janos Kadar reasserted control of Hungary once again.
In isolation, this surface summary of the Uprising tells of an extraordinary event. The fact that the Soviet Union was able to act with such impunity may seem all too relevant in light of Russia’s brutal invasion and occupation of Ukraine. However, this perception of the Uprising can only be achieved by looking at the event in isolation. Once we look at the sheer scale of Soviet and, later Russian, military interventions in foreign countries in addition to its tragic predictability, the event seems far less extraordinary and…well ordinary for lack of a better word. Coupled with the fact that it did not change the extent of Soviet control or inter-European relations, the very notion that this event is something that merits a status as a shocking event seems a little far fetched. However, despite this cynical lens, the event and those who suffered as a result of it should still be seen as worthy of historical discussion, especially when utilised alongside other military interventions as a collective of the effects of Soviet and later, Russian tyranny upon Europe.
To begin, the very notion that this event is a unique one can be easily disproved when analysing the role that military interventions have played in the Soviet and also Russian foreign policy. From the very onset of the October Revolution, the illegitimacy of the Boslevhik government promoted the use of military conquest as a crutch in foreing affairs. Instead of utilising diplomacy and political skill as a means of control, the Soviet Union preferred the use of military expansion as an effective tool of statecraft, with a prime example being Armenia. Only three years after coming to power on the 24th of October 1917, the Red Army invaded the Eastern European country in the hopes of subjugating it, eventually leading to its integration into Trans-Caucasain Soviet Socialsit Republic by 1922. This example shares many similar aspects to that of the Hungarian Uprising 36 years later, with a revolution and brief governmental establishment followed by an invasion and assertion of Soviet power through mass appointment of puppets under the Nomenklatura system. With this action, military intervention became a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy, helping to ensure their control right up until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Yet, why stop with armenia? Soviet interventions occurred in China in an attempt to bring a Soviet client state under their control in 1934, in Finland during the Winter War of 1939-40, through covert military aid in the Korean War from 1950-53, the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, in Afghanistan on the 24th of December 1979 and many other conflicts- such as several Central African civil wars during the 1970s. What this rather lengthy list shows us is simple. Soviet military intervention in states under their spheres of influence was common throughout 20th century history since it allowed them to exercise control and stability. Arguably, the act of sending troops abroad to keep neighbouring states in line has continued right up to the present day with the two wars in Chechnya from 1994-2000 and the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In this long series of wars, why should the Hungarian Uprising be considered special amongst them? Almost all of these wars include a long list of civilian deaths, establishment of puppet governments and the crushing of revolutions or revolutionary states (such as in Armenia in 1920 and Georgia in 1921). As mentioned, the only reason for its relevance today is as a direct result of our curriculum seeking out easy to talk about conflicts which allow for the isolated description of events as noted at the beginning of the essay. Instead of looking at the Uprising with a laser focus, we should rather focus our attention on Soviet and Russian interventions in foreign countries as a collective. By doing this, it helps us to understand the role that military conflicts have in the state apparatus of modern Russia, itself a direct inheritor of the Soviet system.
Yet, I could go as far to suggest that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is not just a standard Soviet military intervention but also an entirely predictable event, something that strips it further of its status as a shocking and seemingly unprecedented event. Whilst it may seem easy to view such an occurrence as predictable through the benefit of hindsight, the very notion that the new Soviet Premier Nikhita Khrushchev would act in an entirely different way to that of his predecessor Stalin (especially in regards to maintaining international security and influence) is folly. In many regards, the carefully crafted image of Khrushchev as the great reformer and orchestration of the Secret Speech denouncing Stalin is overstated, something best noted in Robert Service’s remark of Khrushchev's rise to power as being “rich in ironies. For the movement away from Stalin's legacy had been engineered by typically Stalinist tactics.”. The fact that Khrushchev rose through the ranks of power in the same way as Stalin had done, appointing loyalists in the Central Committee as Staln had done in his position of General Secretary and purging political opponents like Lazar Kaganovich through demotions as Stalin had done with Bukharin and Ryvok decades previously, clearly indicates that the behaviours of the squeaky clean Soviet premiere would be just as bloody as Stalin when needs be- best exemplified in the Hungarian Uprising. It is best said by the World Socialist Website who, although somewhat biassed, still offer a damning picture of the Uprising’s effect- “The brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956, at the cost of 20,000 lives, decisively answered those who believed that Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s crimes signified the beginning of a process of bureaucratic self-reform.”.
It is short sighted to believe that the Soviet leadership would have sat back as Hungary underwent a period of DeStalinisation beginning with mass student marches by students in Budapest on October 23rd. Would Khrushchev have sat back and watched as Hungary tore itself from the chains of Soviet oppression? Obviously not. Especially following the appointment of Nagy as head of a more moderate government, who ushered in a wave of reforms. From the moment that Nagy’s announcement of Hungary’s departure from the Warsaw Pact escaped his lips, he signed his own death warrant. There was no chance that Khrushchev would allow the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, barely a year old after being established in May 1955- thus leading to a massive propaganda defeat for the new Soviet leader, mere months from assembling total power in 1957. Whilst the Warsaw Pact framed itself to be a contender to NATO, its fragility (barely being held in place through terror of Soviet retaliation) ensured that the departure of Hungary would have almost certainly led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. All of these factors were known to Western governments yet the invasion of Soviet troops on the 4th of November was still met with surprised bewilderment by most governments. However, this should be attributed more to denial than just active foolishness just as the inaction of the West in the months following Putin’s ill fated invasion of Ukraine should also be seen as an act of denial. In both cases, the Occident did not believe that the Russian forces would risk the emergence of war in Europe for the reestablishment of state control. In both cases, they were wrong. Simply put, whilst the benefit of historical hindsight imbues the events of the Uprising with a tragic crimson hue, even at the time it should have been clear to many- if not all- that the Soviet troops would have invaded Hungary the minute he announced his wave of reforms. Thus, the status of the Hungarian Uprising as this shocking event is diminished. Instead, like many events in the Russian political world, it takes on an air of melancholy predictability.
Furthermore the perceived importance of the Hungarian Uprising as an event that fundamentally changed the balance of power within Europe is also ill placed. In fact, the Hungarian Uprising did little to change the relations between East and West, nor did it impact inter-European relations in the long term. Whilst the Soviet Union were able to establish themselves once against the rulers of Hungary through the appointment of loyalist Janos Kadar and the execution of Nagy in 1958, these gains in Soviet soft power were quickly squandered by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which ultimately showed the weakness of the Soviet system and entirely destroyed in the humiliating retreat during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. It is important to mention these two events since they fundamentally defined the relationship between East and West during the early 1960s. The events of the Revolution were swallowed up by these two occurrences and therefore ultimately did not matter a great deal in the long term. Any allies that Khrushchev may have gained in the Politburo from his decisive action against Hungarian revolutionaries was also squandered by his hare brained agricultural schemes in addition to the failure of his political reforms and the humiliation of the Cuban Missile Crisis, all of which culminated in his dismissal by the Central Committee in 1964. Once again the effects of the Revolution are overshadowed by far more seminal political events and decisions that arguably impacted the future of the Cold War in far greater ways than the Uprising, further diminishing the importance of the Uprising as a seminal event that changed European politics. As a result of this, whilst the effects of the Uprising were dire for those Hungarian civilians faced with a brutal invasion, the event pales in comparison to other crises.
All of these factors paint a bleak picture, in which the “Soviet invasion” as quoted by the BBC report on the uprising does not matter in the wider context of history. Whilst it may be a darling of creators of the history curriculum in this country due to its convenient place in the centre of the Cold War, it fundamentally was a tragically predictable event (due to the fact that the USSR would not allow any Eastern European country to liberate itself from its oppression) which was overshadowed by far greater and impactful global events. Yet, despite the fact that it is neither unique nor important, it should not be cast aside in the annals of recent history. Rather, it should be viewed not as a microcosm of Soviet brutality but alongside more obscure military interventions to put on display the full extent of Soviet military interventions whilst also helping us to understand why the Russian Federation relies on military interventions so much as a method of control. Whilst it may not have had a decisive effect on European politics, the brave actions of those like Imre Nagy who attempted to resist Soviet subjugation should be celebrated as acts of heroism that can be admired. Do not take such an evaluation of the Hungarian Uprising to be a cynical disregard of the great loss suffered by thousands of innocent Hugnarians. Rather, use the event in a collective acknowledgement of all who suffered- and continue to suffer- under Soviet and Russian tyranny.
Bibliography:
A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Armenia, https://history.state.gov/countries/armenia
A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Hungary, https://history.state.gov/countries/hungary
The Penguin History of Modern Russia by Robert Service, p336
Penguin History of Modern Russia by Robert Service, p334-
US Department of State Archive - Hungary, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/107186.htm
World Socialist Web Site- The Impact of the Hungarian Revolution, https://www.wsws.org/en/special/library/heritage/23.html
On This Day, BBC Report on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/4/newsid_2739000/2739039.stm