NOAH BUCKLE
Note: As the present article relies heavily on the argumentation of Kant (comprising, more or less, a presentation or interpretation of the basics of his moral philosophy), I have not indicated in every case where Kant is quoted directly, choosing instead to supplement each discussion with a citation of the relevant passage(s). I see a great deal of value in his ethics, so much so that I feel it necessary only to reiterate the words of Jean Paul Richter: “For heaven’s sake, buy two books: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and [his] Critique of Practical Reason!”
I. Definitions
Where ‘or’ is italicised, it is intended to indicate the identity of two or more expressions.
Will: [1] Everything in nature operates in accordance with laws, by which I mean those formulae according to which an event follows necessarily from its conditions. [2] If a being were to possess a will, it would mean a capacity to act in accordance with principles, by which I in turn mean the mere representation, or conception, of laws. [3] Now, what is required for the derivation of actions from laws (or their representation) is reason, by which I mean the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. [4] So, the will, as a capacity to act, presupposes the faculty of reason, or the will is reason insofar as it is practical. (Gr 4:412, p. 66)
Practical principles: [5] If a being were to possess a will, then it would (by [2]) act according to practical principles, by which I mean propositions containing a general determination of the will. [6] And, as such principles are practical, they are (by [4]) fundamentally rational, i.e. they provide a reason for action that is either subjective or objective. [7] By subjective practical principle, or maxim, I mean any principle which contains a rule determined by reason in accordance with the specific circumstances of the individual subject, i.e. a principle on which they act. [8] By objective practical principle, I mean any principle determined by reason absolutely, without regard for the specific circumstances of the individual subject, i.e. a principle on which they ought to act. (Gr 4:421n, p. 73)
Objective practical principles: [9] If a being were to possess objective practical principles, then it would (by [8]) be subject to them as imperatives, by which I mean principles whose expression (through an ought) involves an act which, if reason determined the will completely, would occur necessarily. [10] But, these imperatives either express a conditional necessity, or a hypothetical nature, by which I mean they presuppose a condition of the subject (determination with respect to the adequacy of a subject to fulfil an end); [11] or, they express an unconditional necessity, or a categorical nature, by which I mean they do not presuppose a condition of the subject (determination of the will alone). [12] So, the latter alone, i.e. objective practical principles expressing a categorical imperative, are (by [1]) deserving of the title ‘practical law’. (KpV 5:20–21, p. 154)
Schol.: The objection that [1] merely refers to an event following from conditions, and so that we must regard hypothetical imperatives, insofar as they stand (by [10]) under conditions, as practical laws, arises from a confusion of two senses of ‘condition’: that in nature, which is objective; and that in a rational agent, which is subjective (in the sense of contingency). For while it is true that, were an agent determined entirely by reason, hypothetical imperatives would follow from their condition with the same necessity as the descent of a ball dropped from a height, they nonetheless presuppose an end to be realised, unlike both the inanimate ball and the categorically-determined will.
Subjective practical principles: [13] If a being were to possess subjective practical principles (henceforth maxims), then it would (by [7]) be subject to them as self-imposed rules of volition. [14] So, one cannot possess a maxim if one is not at the same time aware of one’s possession of it, i.e. one must adopt a maxim, or take it up into one’s will; in other words, I cannot act on a principle of which I know nothing. [15] And, as maxims are (by [7]) principles on which I act (of the form ‘In circumstances of kind x, act in such a way as y’), rather than acts themselves, they are general with respect to the manner of their execution, having under them several further rules. [16] So, determination of the will by a maxim therefore by no means implies determination in the act. [17] And, as maxims, qua practical principles, are (by [6]) rational, they must therefore be held by the subject (correctly or otherwise) to suggest the best kind of action for the realisation of a given end under their respective circumstances. [18] Finally, as maxims, qua principles bearing upon the will of a rational being, are (by [17], which merely makes explicit the nature of a wilful act implicit in [2]), directed towards some end, they necessarily involve an interest, by which I mean that by virtue of which reason becomes practical and which suggests the desirability of a particular end in the broadest sense, that is, either pathologically (when it is based in inclination, or empirical [a posteriori] determinations of the will), or purely (when it is based in reason alone, or pure [a priori] determinations of the will). [19] So, a rational agent is, at its roots, one which spontaneously develops an interest, e.g. the maximisation of pleasure, corresponding to a determination of its will, e.g. self-love as an inclination, and adopts maxims conducive to its satisfaction, e.g. to shorten or extend my life proportional to the pleasure or displeasure I expect from its continuation. (Gr 4:422, p. 74)
Self-determination: [20] If a being were to possess a will, it would (by the entire series of [1–4]) possess the property of self-determination, by which I mean that of being a law unto itself through the self-imposition of practical principles. [21] Now, if the will is a law unto itself according to principles given to it externally, by the relation in which some object stands to it [the will], it is heteronomous, by which I mean determined (logically, but not causally) to act by an [empirical] inclination or desire (explicable in terms of the subject’s sensuous needs insofar as it falls under natural laws) for the realisation of a given end. [22] But, if the will is a law unto itself according to principles which it gives (internally) to itself, independently of every property pertaining to its objects, it is autonomous, by which I mean determined to act (or rather, determinable) by a reason irreducible to an [empirical] inclination or desire, i.e. which is inexplicable in terms of natural laws. (KpV 5:33, p. 166)
Schol. 1: An autonomous will is (by [21]) not defined by its independence from causal necessitation by empirical inclination, for this independence may also belong to a heteronomous will. Similarly, it is (by [22]) not defined by its independence from empirical inclination in absolutione, for such a total independence does not follow from the definition of a rational being (given in [1–4]); to ascribe such an independence to an autonomous will would require the further demonstration that a rational being cannot be sensuous. Hence, all it means to call a will ‘autonomous’ is that I recognise in this will a capacity for self-determination independent of what sensuous needs it may have, i.e. a purity.
Schol. 2: In identifying heteronomy with dependence upon affection by “[empirical] inclination or desire,” the qualifier empirical is operant: this sense of inclination does not simply mean ‘motivation’, for even a purely rational determining ground of the will is an inclination in this sense (this also bears repeating for the “broadest sense” of the “desirability of a particular end”); nor does it mean ‘immediate sensation’, for even heteronomy of the will allows for independence of this sort.
II. Analytic
General nature of a practical law: [23] A categorical imperative is (by [12]) the only kind of principle that can be considered a practical law, by which I mean a law given (by [3]) to reason by itself, which holds (by [8]) objectively and (by [1]) universally, i.e. without regard for the subjective conditions (OPP, Schol.) of the individual. [24] So, a practical law refers only to a pure determination of the will, abstracting completely from what is attained by its realisation as an efficient cause, or its force does not derive from the adequacy of a subject to fulfil its end(s). [25] Now, it is clear that any principle which presupposes an object, i.e. a desirable end to be realised, is (by [10]) empirical (SD, Schol. 2), insofar as it determines the will according to a subjective condition of pleasure (in the satisfaction of a sensuous need); [26] so, they can be pathological maxims, but never practical laws. [27] And, if a practical law cannot employ an object, i.e. that which is material, as the determining ground of the will, then those subjective practical principles which fall under it (insofar as it is an objective practical principle) must therefore either be inexpressible, or expressible through their form alone, having no recourse to the material. (Gr 4:444, p. 92; KpV 5:21–22, p. 155)
Practical law and autonomy: [28] That the mere legislative form of a maxim, which is (by [27]) not empirical, must be the standard for their adoption, therefore presupposes a real capacity to determine oneself independently of these empirical conditions (natural laws). [29] But, this is (by [22]; SD, Schol. 1–2) just what it means to be autonomous; and so a will for whom a maxim’s legislative form suffices as a determining ground is autonomous, or transcendentally free. (KpV 5:28–29, p. 162)
Autonomy and practical law: [30] That an autonomous will, which is (by [22]; SD, Schol. 1–2) independent of empirical conditions (natural laws), must nonetheless be [self-]determinable in accordance with practical laws, therefore presupposes a real, immaterial ground of the will. [31] But this is (by [27]) just what it means for there to be the mere legislative form of a maxim; and so an autonomous, or transcendentally free, will is determined by the legislative form of a maxim. [32] So, autonomy and real practical law are (by [28–31]) reciprocal. (KpV 5:29, p. 162)
[33] An autonomous will is therefore determined a priori according to the following law, which arises formally through the will itself, as an unconditional objective practical principle, or categorical imperative: [34] ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ (Gr 4:421, p. 73; KpV 5:30, p. 164)
[35] Autonomy, understood as transcendental freedom, both in the negative and positive sense (its aforementioned independence; and self-determination according to legislative form, respectively), has (by [20]) until now been treated as a property. [36] But, autonomy may equally be treated as a principle, insofar as the formula of the categorical imperative given is (by [34]) simply the demand for practical reason to act according to the property of being a “law unto itself,” or for practical reason to act appropriately to its nature, so as not to involve itself in a contradiction. (Gr 4:440, p. 89)
III. Deduction
It does not follow from their reciprocity that autonomy (construed as the supreme principle of morality) and the moral law may actually be derived from one another, such that the order of their presentation is arbitrary; a proposition of the form, ‘If A, then B; if B, then A’, in fact tells us nothing of the reality of A or B, and it may very well be the case that the reality of only one of the two can be established outside of this proposition (which is what is really demanded). The concern in attempting to derive the reality of the moral law from that of autonomy is, briefly, this: that if we hold rational beings to possess a will, yet also that the will is itself practical reason, this possession may either imply that reason can be practically oriented, or that pure reason is practically oriented. And while both demonstrate practical freedom in the sense of self-determination, only the latter, insofar as it alone involves the further principle that this self-determination may abstract from everything empirical in a maxim (leaving merely the legislative form), is sufficient to prove transcendental freedom, or ‘real’ autonomy (which is the supposed force from which the moral law would spring, but which cannot be shown non-morally). So, it seems that we are left to derive autonomy from the reality of the moral law as a fact of pure reason. However, as we will see, this procedure is by no means unproblematic, and so we may be expected to progress beyond the ‘mere’ reciprocity indicated here.
The fact itself: [37] The fact of reason from which autonomy, or the practicality of pure reason, would (by [32]) follow necessarily cannot simply be the moral law itself, as elaborated in [23–27; 34], for all this has demonstrated is that, were a moral law to exist, it would be thought as a categorical imperative. [38] But, if the fact of reason cannot pertain to the thought or essence of the moral law, yet must originate from the moral law all the same, it must therefore pertain to the moral law in its real being or existence, namely, as it is recognised purely by reason. [39] So, the fact of reason must be reason’s consciousness of the moral law as the supreme law of any possible will. [40] But by this, I do not mean a kind of intellectual intuition of the formal principle given in [34], but rather refer to the fact that any moral deliberation (even if conjectural or illusory) must really be subject to the practical constraints outlined in Part I. [41] Finally, that the most fundamental result of the aforementioned elaboration of morality is that “were a moral law to exist, it would be thought as a categorical imperative,” and that this imperative necessarily involves (by [23]) recourse to the faculty of reason and to a non-empirical objectivity, universality, and necessity, therefore demonstrates that the fact of [37–40] must be specifically of reason. (KpV 5:91, p. 213)
Schol.: I say possible will, because to say ‘the supreme law of its will’ might wrongly give the appearance of a petitio principii, when the practicality of [pure] reason is precisely what is at stake.
The deduction: [42] The fact of reason’s consciousness of the moral law [as binding] necessarily produces an interest (which must be (by, e.g., [24]) pure) in it. [43] But, this consciousness of its binding nature and of an interest in it appear not to be sufficient to establish autonomy, insofar as my consciousness is (by [39]) merely a rational consciousness of the autonomy of any possible will, and so does not ascribe to myself this practicality. [44] But, in recognising a pure interest, pure reason gives to itself something by virtue of which it becomes practical. [45] So, pure reason is practical, or autonomy is a property of the will of every rational being. [46] But, it would also seem that this deduction is insufficient, for this capacity to be motivated by purely practical reason, i.e. the principle of autonomy, may nonetheless be absolutely subject to a causal or logical determination by inclination, i.e. heteronomy. [47] But, the possession of autonomy, construed (by [35]) positively as a capacity for moral motivation, also entails (by, again, [35]) an independence from natural laws (of causality), and so we are justified in speaking of practical reason’s belonging to a purely intelligible order of determinability. [48] But, it must be reiterated that this independence, or mere intelligibility, is not a possible object of experience, nor is it an empirical proof of exemption from inclination and pathology either, but rather a consciousness of autonomy as the possibility, not merely of acting following a choice, but of freely making the choice itself, or a consciousness of moral responsibility. [49] So, what has been demonstrated is that, though there remains (and must remain, insofar as we recognise the necessity of invoking an intelligible order when going beyond laws of causality) the epistemic possibility that freedom is illusory, if one assumes the authenticity of one’s consciousness of the moral law as a fact of reason, freedom must be taken to be actual, i.e. evident from our taking in an interest in morality through our consciousness of it, or from a practical standpoint. (KpV 5:30–32, p. 163–165; 5:97, p. 217; 5:44, p. 175; 5:29, p. 163)
[50] Kant famously conjoined the “starry heavens above” and the “moral law within” as the two things which “fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily one reflects upon them”. (KpV 5:161, p. 269) Now, we are in a position to truly appreciate what this means: that the moral law is itself a solar system unto itself, that is, a vast expanse containing the ground of its determinacy purely and entirely within itself –– in a word, freedom.
References
Gr: Kant, Immanuel (1996). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
KpV: Kant, Immanuel (1996). Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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